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INTELLIGENCE

# DIRECTORATE OF MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Vietnam

**Top Secret** 114


28 June 1967

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ARMY review(s) completed.

	Approved for Release 2004/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002200330001-5	
	Information as of 1600 28 June 1967  HIGHLIGHTS	25X1
	US Marines and ARVN units in the Khe Sanh area of northwestern Quang Tri Province are continuing to encounter heavy enemy resistance.	25X1 25X1
25V1	I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Probable elements of the 325th NVA Division are maintaining heavy pressure against US/ARVN Operation CROCKETT in Ouang Tri Province (Para 1)  Ele-	25X1
25X1	ments of the Viet Cong 5th Light Infantry Division may again be preparing for major operations in southeastern III Corps (Paras. 5-9). Two major Communist commands—the B-3 Western Highlands Front and Headquarters, Military Region 5—apparently are coordinating offensive operations in II Corps (Paras. 10-13). The Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics (Para. 14). (Note: The graphical annex on battle statistics will be published on 29 June.)	
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VI. <u>Other Majo</u> as been reported on outh Vietnam's Kien	C Aspects: A No. 1 Cambodian ter Tuong Province	Tiet Cong arsenal critory opposite ce (Para. 1).	
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Elements probably of the NVA 325th Division are continuing to maintain heavy pressure against US Marine and supporting ARVN units conducting Operation CROCKETT in the Khe Sanh area of northwestern Quang Tri Province. Thus far in two days of sporadically heavy fighting spanning 26 and 27 June, allied forces have sustained casualties of 21 killed (19 US) and 155 wounded (152 US), compared with known enemy losses of 28 killed.
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#### Possible Offensive Activity by Viet Cong 5th Division

that elements of the Viet Cong 5th Light Infantry Division may again be preparing for the initiation of major operations against allied forces in southeastern III Corps.

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- 7. This intensified enemy reconnaissance activity is similar to that noted just prior to 19 June, when battalion-size elements of the 274th Regiment attacked the command post of the US 11th ACR in Phuoc Tuy Province. The 274th lost 56 killed in that action, in contrast to US casualties of eight killed and 31 wounded. The US armored unit, along with two battalions of the US 9th Infantry Division and one ARVN battalion, was participating in Operation AKRON at the time of the attack.
- 8. AKRON was initiated on 8 June in the Bien Hoa Long Khanh Phuoc Tuy province triborder area with the objective of clearing elements of the Viet Cong 5th Division and local guerrilla forces from an important Communist base area in southwestern III Corps. To date, 94 Viet Cong have been killed against allied losses of 15 killed and 78 wounded. As the operation continues its encroachment upon sensitive enemy redoubts in the area, Communist main and local force resistance can be expected to harden.

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9. Late MACV reports indicate that an ARVN ranger battalion, reinforced by elements of the US 11th ACR, was heavily engaged by an enemy force of undetermined strength during the night of 27-28 June some 40 miles northeast of Saigon in Long Khanh Province. According to preliminary casualty reports, five ARVN soldiers were killed and 28 wounded (one US); enemy losses were not reported.

Coordination of Enemy Operations in II Corps

suggest that two major

communist commands--the B-3 Western Highlands Front
and Headquarters, Military Region 5 (MR 5)--are
coordinating offensive operations in II Corps.

- ll. A notebook captured on 3 May near the Plei Me Special Forces camp in western Pleiku Province stated that "B-3 will coordinate its actions with all battlefields of the region," probably meaning the highland and coastal delta battlefields of MR 5. During May and June, elements of the B-3 Front have sharply increased their activity in both Pleiku and Kontum provinces, while elements of the NVA 5th Division have done likewise in the coastal regions of II Corps, particularly in Phu Yen Province. 16 June, enemy forces in Phu Yen launched early morning attacks in the Tuy Hoa - Dong Tre Special Forces camp area, while those in Kontum Province simultaneously attacked Tan Canh and Kontum city with mortar and rocket fire--possibly indicating that the actions in both provinces were coordinated.
- 12. Documents captured on 22 June near Dak To Special Forces camp indicate that during May and June MR 5 was to provide logistical support to elements of the NVA 24th Regiment operating in Kontum Province. In addition to its probable logistical dependence upon MR 5, the 24th-which is accepted in the MACV order of battle as an independent NVA regiment based in Kontum-is believed to be operationally controlled by the B-3 Front. The recent upsurge of activity by the 24th Regiment in the Dak To area has been interpreted as an effort by the B-3 Front to force a major diversion of allied troop

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strength from the Front's principal strategic area of operations in adjacent western Pleiku Province.

13.

provided the first firm
evidence that the B-3 Front and MR 5 planned coordinated operations in II Corps, in conjunction with
operations by the Northern Front/DMZ Front in northern I Corps, as part of this year's "summer campaign"
in the northern half of South Vietnam. The B-3
Front's reported mission during the "summer campaign"—
to disperse, tie down, and destroy US forces in the
highlands in an effort to prevent allied reinforcement
of the coastal delta area of II Corps—is a reliable
indication that Hanoi's primary concern in MR 5 is
control of the rice—rich, populous, coastal regions.

#### Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics

14. The week of 18-24 June compared with the week of 11-17 June:

#### I. <u>Viet Cong Incidents</u>

	11-17 June	18-24 June
Attacks	49	33
Battalion or Larger Small Unit		0 33
Harassment	385	308
Terrorism	37 13	35
Sabotage Propaganda	13 11	12 4
Antiaircraft	257	268
TOTAL INCIDENTS	752	660

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#### II. Casualties

	VC/	NVA	GVN		
	1 <b>1-</b> 17 June	18-24 June	ll-17 June	18-24 June	
Killed Wounded Missing/	1,852	1,905	213 556	119 330	
Captured			_14		
TOTALS	1,852	1,905	783	488	

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	11-17 June	18-24 June	11-17 June	18-24 June	
Killed	143	273	22	15	
Wounded Missing/	953	1,258	53	25	
Captured			<u></u>	<del></del>	
TOTALS	1,096	1,531	75	40	

### III. Weapons Captured


	VC	/NVA	GVN		
	11-17 June	18-24 June	11-17 June	18-24 June	
Individual Crew-Served	416 <u>44</u>	Not Reported	115 3	105 0	
TOTALS	460		118	105	

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#### VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS

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new building construction and numerous defensive positions in the same area.

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the facility is under the direction of two Chinese Communists, and includes grenade, mine, weapons repair, and casting units. The arsenal is in an area of Cambodia's Svay Rieng Province, believed to be a support area of the Viet Cong's Dong Thap 2 Regiment.

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